by Dr. Li-Meng Yan, America Outloud:
On Aug 11, CBP announced: “CBP agriculture specialists in Los Angeles seized 6,682 lbs of unmanifested avian, swine, and ruminant products from China, shipped by a repeat offender and falsely labeled as tilapia.” (https://x.com/CBP/status/1954890800413696471) This case is far from an ordinary instance of food smuggling. It represents a nation-level biosecurity warning. From a strategic perspective, it strikes at the heart of America’s agricultural defense system: highly pathogenic animal viruses such as African Swine Fever (ASF) could infiltrate the United States through such channels, triggering cascading shocks to livestock production, food security, and social stability.
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I. Characteristics of ASF and the Risk of Cold-Chain Penetration
ASF is a DNA virus that infects only pigs, not humans, but it has an extremely high fatality rate—between 90% and 100%—and no commercial vaccine. The virus can survive for long periods in low-temperature environments: it remains stable in frozen meat for months and retains infectivity in salted meat, sausages, or feed. This means that smuggled frozen meat—especially pork, tools, or packaging originating from infected areas—can serve as a “silent viral carrier.”
If the virus enters the U.S. through smuggled goods and contaminates slaughterhouses, feed chains, or transport equipment, the defensive line could collapse. The only viable containment measure would be mass culling and regional lockdowns. This would lead to slaughterhouse shutdowns, soaring pork prices, frozen exports, farm bankruptcies, agricultural credit defaults, and disruption of the food-supply chain. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has estimated that a nationwide ASF outbreak could inflict hundreds of billions of dollars in losses.
Even more alarming, the United States has about six million wild boars spread across 35 states. These animals are highly mobile and extremely difficult to eradicate. Once ASF establishes a “wild-boar–domestic-pig” transmission cycle, the virus could persist indefinitely in the natural environment, forming an unremovable ecological proxy and transforming a single outbreak into a long-term systemic disaster.
II. The “Suspicious Chain” of China’s ASF Epidemic
Placed against the backdrop of China’s ASF outbreaks since 2018, this case appears even more dangerous. China’s handling of ASF has been riddled with abnormalities:
- Delayed reporting and information suppression – After the first case in Liaoning in August 2018, the disease spread nationwide within months, yet no complete public data were released. Local authorities often concealed outbreaks “for stability maintenance,” and only acknowledged them when pork prices skyrocketed.
- Abnormally rapid spread – Multiple provinces saw simultaneous outbreaks within a single quarter, far exceeding natural-transmission models.
- Opaque vaccine experiments – The PLA and military-linked agricultural institutes were reported to have conducted unregulated experimental immunizations; by 2021, mutant ASF strains emerged, raising suspicions of laboratory leaks.
- Data inconsistent with reality – Officials claimed tens of millions of pigs were culled, while international estimates exceeded 200 million. China’s surging pork imports confirmed domestic production collapse.
- Contaminated exports – Multiple countries detected ASF viral fragments in pork products imported from China, proving the infection chain was never cut off.
This pattern of continuous, opaque, and unaccountable management mirrors China’s early handling of COVID-19—delays, underreporting, and refusal to cooperate internationally—all showing a regime that prioritizes political stability over biosafety. In the case of ASF, such governance allowed the virus to circulate domestically for years and created conditions for external spillover.
III. Strategic Warning to the United States
When a nation with persistent ASF outbreaks and non-transparent regulation continues to be caught exporting mislabeled frozen products, the threat has already surpassed “trade violation” levels. Even without direct proof of state intent, this behavioral pattern displays high deniability and strategic destructiveness, perfectly fitting the doctrine of unrestricted warfare:
- Low cost – execution requires no military force;
- High concealment – outbreaks can be disguised as natural events;
- Long latency – delayed effects make attribution difficult;
- Massive impact – can destroy industrial chains and public trust.
Combined with the ecological transmission channel of wild boars, the U.S. agricultural system is effectively exposed to a delayed-activation biological weapon system.
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